The State is Not Enough: The Politics of Expanding and Improving Schooling in Developing Countries*

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Expanding education to reach all children is expensive. In the most affluent democracies, where educational coverage is nearly universal, primary and secondary education accounted for an average of approximately 8.7 percent of government expenditures in 1999.1 Because it absorbs a significant portion of available resources, providing universal education entails high opportunity costs for states.

The expansion of state-run or state-financed basic education may also be controversial because it entails increasing the influence of the state over society. This can provoke societal disputes, as different groups argue over who will influence the direction of state expansion (Platt, 1965) and, more contentiously, who will pay (see Weiler, 1984). Because educational expansion is costly and can be politically contentious, it is highly contingent on the existence of political incentives and pressures. States will expand education only if they face strong enough political incentives and pressures to do so, and if they can overcome political obstacles.

This essay reviews political-science literature for the concepts and facts that shed light on the obstacles to educational expansion and ways of removing or circumventing those obstacles. It incorporates theoretical and empirical works—by international relations theorists, comparativists, political economists, as well as historians, anthropologists, and education experts interested in politics—on the incentives and pressures that developing coun-

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tries face when deciding whether and how to expand and improve educational coverage. Although the field of political science may not reveal easy solutions to expansion-related conflicts, it can offer insights into the types of conflict that may emerge, the likely actors, and the various opportunities to confront these conflicts.

The central argument of the paper is straightforward: incentives and pressures for states to expand education and improve educational efficiency, particularly for the poorest and most remote populations, are weak and sometimes perverse. On their own, states in developing countries are unlikely to achieve sufficient institutional capacity and political accountability to establish universal primary and secondary educational coverage. The good news is that weak incentives and pressures can be augmented. For this, states will need extra help and extra funding. The involvement of both external and societal actors seems unavoidable, though potentially polemical.

**INCENTIVES, PRESSURES AND STAGES**

The incentives and pressures that drive educational expansion differ as expansion progresses. Mounting evidence suggests that, over time, the expansion of education resembles an S-shaped curve (Clemens, 2004; Wils and Goujon, 1998; Fiala and Lanford, 1987; Meyer et al., 1977). Initially, states procrastinate in the provision of education, as the consolidation of power and neutralization of potential rivals outweigh the need to offer services to the population (Tilly, 1985).

When at a later point in their evolution states begin to provide educational services, the coverage typically expands rapidly. During this second stage, expansion is driven not by political incentives and pressures but by “self-generating” forces: demographic growth among the population of educated individuals; low marginal cost of expansion due in part to economies of scale and installed infrastructure capacity; the effects of state expansion, which include a greater demand for white-collar labor and therefore a greater state interest in educational expansion; savings generated by the decline in teacher salaries relative to per capita gross domestic product (GDP); and pressure from organized unions and the already educated, economic growth, and rising household incomes (e.g., Clemens, 2004; Mingat and Tan, 2003; Parrado, 1998; Schultz, 1996; Fuller and Rubinson, 1992). Social and political factors such as levels of political participation, date of independence, ethno-linguistic divisions, regime type and international dependence make little or no difference in explaining different rates of educational expansion among countries, at least expansion occurring between 1950 and 1970 (Meyer et al., 1977).

These “self-generating” forces do not continue indefinitely. After reaching another threshold of coverage, educational expansion slows again, possibly stagnating or declining. At this point, the marginal costs of expansion increase steeply. Reaching the last sectors of the population is extraordinarily costly, often because it entails going to geographically remote or sparsely populated
regions, or because unenrolled children are the most economically disadvantaged. Unless states find strong incentives and pressures to go forward with educational expansion, progress toward universal education may stall.

VARIATIONS IN COVERAGE AND QUALITY SINCE THE 1960S

Both the speed of progress in the expansion of educational coverage and the quality of education provided vary across countries. In a study focused largely on primary education, Clemens (2004) finds that although after 1960 the typical country took about 28 years to get from 75 percent net enrollment to 90 percent—significantly faster than was the case prior to the 1960s—there are huge differences in speed across countries (2004: 16). Similarly, Figures 1 and 2 show variation in the speed of expansion of secondary education. Figure 1 shows educational expansion among countries that started with less than 10 percent coverage (using the gross enrollment rate for secondary education) in the 1960s; Figure 2 shows expansion among countries that started with coverage ranging between 10 percent and 20 percent. The achievements of individual countries over the same time period vary considerably. Some countries made little progress; others traveled far. The most striking variations occur among the countries that had the lowest starting points in the 1960s.

Among the countries that are close (or on-track) to achieving universal coverage, two central issues arise: the efficiency of investment and the quality of instruction. Although these vary across countries, developing countries tend to spend inefficiently, over-investing in inputs that have a limited impact on educational attainment (e.g., salary increases, rather than teaching materials, testing, or infrastructure) (Bruns et al., 2003). Likewise, mounting evidence points to variations in quality across education systems. Standardized tests of academic achievement provide the information most commonly used to indicate or compare quality across countries. These show an abysmal gap between the levels of student attainment in advanced democracies and the levels in developing countries, as well as between the attainment of Asian stu-

2. In every country, completion rates are lowest for children from poor and rural households (Bruns et al., 2003: 32), and in South Asia and the Middle East, completion rates are lower for girls than for boys (Levine et al., 2003).

3. The gross enrollment rate is calculated by dividing the total number of students enrolled at a particular level of education (regardless of the official age for that level) by the population that, according to national regulations, should be enrolled at this level. The ratio may exceed 100 percent because some enrolled students may be below or above the official primary-or secondary-school age. The net enrollment ratio is calculated by dividing the total number of enrolled students within the official primary or secondary school age by the population that, according to national regulations, should be enrolled at this level.

4. The use of test results as indicators of educational quality can be polemical because, among other things, they do not easily allow researchers to distinguish the effect of the education system from individual effort and other non-school-related factors. Nevertheless, test results are often preferred to other indicators of quality (e.g., completion rates, future income of graduates) because tests can be systematically applied across countries.
students and Latin American students (see World Bank, 2003; OECD, 2002). Student performance is not easy to explain on the basis of economic inputs, such as low teacher-pupil ratio or expenditures per pupil (Hanushek, 1995; Kremer, 1995; Simmons and Alexander, 1980). A recent attempt to explain the results of the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), a testing program involving more than 40 countries, reveals that school resources play a limited role in explaining variations in achievement. Although the study is based on only 37 cases, the results lead the authors to conclude that “looking beyond simple resource policies appears necessary” (Hanushek and Luque, 2003: 498).

This paper looks beyond resources by examining the politics of improving educational coverage and quality. No single study has conclusively
explained variations in coverage and quality, and this paper does not attempt
to carry out such a feat. What follows instead is a synthesis of ideas, as
opposed to a solution to the empirical puzzle of why variations in educational performance exist. This paper highlights arguments from the social sciences that may account for slow expansion or high inefficiency during the last stages of educational expansion.

Scholars who study the development of states (e.g., Tilly, 1992), in particular the rise of state-provided services such as education (e.g., Ginsburg et al., 1990), argue that incentives and pressures emanate from three sources: the international arena (e.g., as a result of the workings of the international economy, the global spread of ideas, or competition with other states); the state (e.g., the desire to promote nationalism or to neutralize domestic rivals); and the society (e.g., the demands for services placed by citizens). I discuss each of these sources.

INTERNATIONAL PRESSURES

States face four types of international pressure to expand education. Three are global in scale: the exigencies of globalization, pressure from multilateral lenders, and the global spread of ideas. One type of pressure is regional, or limited to only a few countries: the desire to emulate or surpass prestigious
peers. There is considerable debate about how decisive each of these pressures is, and in the case of globalization and international lenders, in what direction these pressures push.

Globalization and the Role of Firms

Scholars have long recognized that globalization affects the expansion of education, but they disagree as to whether its effects are positive or negative. One argument suggests that globalization places a premium on skilled, flexible, and adaptable labor; as a result, nations that wish to compete in the world economy need to develop a highly educated workforce. Employers may estimate that a highly trained workforce will be easier and less costly to train than an uneducated workforce. For example, in a study incorporating interviews with company officials and reviews of internal documents, Nelson (2005) finds that high-technology firms consider local levels of educational attainment in choosing investment sites abroad and express this interest to local officials. Another recent study shows that U.S. foreign direct investment in Latin America between 1979 and 1996 gravitated toward countries with higher secondary enrollments, which suggests that education attracts international capital (Tuman and Emmert, 2004). The positive effects of globalization on education may occur through still other mechanisms. In their study of market reforms in Latin America during the 1990s, Stallings and Peres (2000) find that capitalist economies rewarded workers who were more highly skilled, which might increase citizen demand for education. Furthermore, the expansion of trade and capital flows can increase per capita income levels, thus increasing the resources available for education.

Even if globalization does not lead to increased demand by multinational firms for highly skilled workers, it could still lead to competition in the labor market, which might change the expectations of citizens. Facing the anxieties created by market economies, jobseekers might more strongly demand state-provided education as a way to protect themselves from the volatility of markets or to improve their status in comparison to other jobseekers. Although multinational firms may not demand high-level skills, they may nonetheless offer the best wages and working conditions in the country (see Graham, 2000; Moran, 2002). To compete for these better jobs, local citizens may decide to invest in their own education. Individuals pursue education not because it is directly demanded by firms, but because of what it signals to firms—that the worker is self-motivated and more capable of self-improvement than other jobseekers. Insofar as local workers are interested in emigrating, they might pursue education to enhance their chances of admittance into and employment in another country.

This could very well be one of the reasons that Buchmann and Brakewood (2000) find a positive relationship between the growth of the service sector and school enrollment in both Thailand and Kenya. Despite the low-skill nature of service jobs, citizens pursue secondary education to make themselves more competitive in comparison to other job applicants and more attractive to employers in this sector. It has thus been posited that capitalism
generates demand for education, on the part of both firms and jobseekers. This might explain why the most globalized economies in the world also have the largest public sectors, of which education is a major component (Garrett, 1999; Rodrik, 1997; Cameron, 1978).

The opposing argument, that globalization has a negative influence on educational expansion, suggests that there are limits to the demand for skilled labor stemming from contemporary capitalism. Although some firms require skilled labor, the preponderance of demand is for cheap and docile labor. Tendler (2002) even finds a “fear of education” among owners and managers of large modern manufacturing firms in the textile, garment, and footwear sectors of Northeast Brazil. These firms remained competitive and export-oriented by investing precisely in high-illiteracy zones, and feared that more education would make workers “uppity.” A second view argues that, to stay competitive, states and firms need to keep costs low. As a result, the exigencies of capitalism penalize states that spend too much to provide education and firms that spend too much to maintain a highly educated workforce. Some critics of globalization hold the contentious view that a global economy diminishes the capacities of nation-states to tax, and thus, to raise revenue for the provision of social services (e.g., Gray, 1998; Tilly, 1995; Cable, 1995). Education could very well be one casualty of this retrenchment.5

Perhaps the best evidence on behalf of the argument for globalization as a positive force is the response of several East Asian countries to a changing global economy. Starting in the 1960s, eight “high performing East Asian economies,” to use the World Bank label, having experienced an impressive drop in the school-age population, significantly expanded primary and secondary schooling and made dramatic improvements in quality and student achievement. For some countries, this educational expansion was a purposeful strategy to achieve international competitiveness by building human capital (Stiglitz, 1996; World Bank, 1993).

However, evidence against the positive-force argument is substantial as well. If capitalism is such an influential driver of education, why is it that only eight countries in the developing world have made great efforts toward and succeeded in the improvement of education? A study by the World Bank (2002) shows that between 1980 and 1997 the 29 “most globalized” nations, despite faster overall economic growth, did not expand secondary enrollments more than other nations (although they did much better in the expansion of primary education).6 The demands of firms and the self-motivation of

5. For a summary, see Ginsburg et al., 1990.

6. The World Bank (2002: 33) studied 73 developing countries. The countries are divided into two groups: the 24 most globalized nations, which increased their ratios of trade to GDP by the largest amounts between 1980 and 1997; and the rest. The World Bank excluded the richest economies (i.e., the OECD countries plus Chile, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong) from the list of the “most globalized.” Although, in comparison to other countries, the most globalized group experienced an impressive expansion in the average years of primary enrollment for adults (from 2.4 to 3.8 versus 2.5 to 3.1), they did not perform any better in terms of secondary enrollment (from 0.8 to 1.3 versus 0.7 to 1.3).
citizens, however strong under capitalism, seem insufficient to achieve universal education.

This is in part because international capitalism does not have a uniform global presence. Foreign direct investments vary considerably: although some firms need skilled labor, others do not (e.g., knowledge-based industries versus textiles); and even firms requiring skilled labor may focus on the quality of college graduates with technical degrees rather than overall schooling of the population. The degree to which countries are exposed to global market forces also varies. Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) study whether variations in exposure to globalization account for differences in social spending, including spending on education, in fourteen Latin American countries between 1973 and 1997. For social spending generally, their most robust finding is that exposure to globalization, measured as the degree of trade integration, negatively affects social spending. Trade in Latin America thus had the opposite effect that it had in Europe: it shrunk the public sector.

Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo also discover that this effect exists only on social security and pension expenditures. The effect of trade on education expenditures is completely different—trade has no significant impact. Rather than economic openness, it is domestic political variables that largely determine spending on human capital: populist governments “squeeze” spending on education to protect pensions, whereas governments in countries transitioning to democracy increase the budget allocations for health and education. It could very well be that more exposure to the exigencies of capitalism prompts governments and constituents to protect education expenditures. In sum, international capitalism is probably neither a strong nor positive force for educational expansion; it seems less powerful than domestic variables in determining educational spending.

**Pressure From Multilateral Organizations**

Another set of external incentives and pressures stems from international organizations that specialize in development issues, especially multilateral financial organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). These organizations offer loans and aid, with strings attached. In 2004, the World Bank financed education projects in 89 low- and middle-income countries. At a minimum, the Bank and other lending organizations require borrowing countries to listen to their technical advice. In theory, borrowers must also agree to conditionalities—implementing certain policies to receive funding. Because countries often resort to multilaterals when they cannot find alternative financing sources, these organizations enjoy bargaining leverage over borrowers.

Critics of multilateral financial organizations make two main arguments about their impact on education: structural-adjustment lending is deleterious to education investments, and pro-education programs sponsored by multilaterals have major leaks—i.e., resources are easily diverted to alternative uses.

The first criticism—typically arising from the left—has seemed less applicable in recent years than it was in the past. Prior to the 1990s, the case could be made that the World Bank advocated policies that had deleterious side effects on educational expansion, such as reductions in social-sector spending, lower teacher salaries, and a focus on revenue generation. An eloquent statement of this belief is made by Geo-Jaya and Mangum (2001), for whom World Bank structural adjustment is “the enemy of human development.” They use the example of Nigeria in the 1980s to show how adjustment led both to cutbacks on educational spending, which diminished the supply of education, and to lower incomes and higher unemployment rates, which diminished citizens’ demands for education. As a result, investors stopped investing because they could not hire qualified workers. Without investment, Nigeria, like other countries in the same position, never could manage to escape its chronic economic crisis.

After the 1990s, however, multilaterals began to stress social spending not only for its role in cushioning the dislocating effects of market-oriented reform, but as an important ingredient for growth (see Hunter and Brown, 2000; Nelson, 1999; Carnoy, 1995; World Bank, 1993). This reflected a dramatic shift in paradigm: more money and more generous lending for education. Between 1970 and 1979, for instance, the World Bank committed an average of $248 million per year for education (in current dollars); today, the annual average is closer to $1.7 billion. Latin America is a good example of the presumed impact of the new World Bank policies. The region worked closely with the World Bank and the IMF to stabilize economies and open markets in the 1990s; the region, together with Africa, was also the largest recipient of education lending from the World Bank. If the argument that “structural adjustment is bad for education” is correct, we should observe declines in education spending in the region. Instead, seven of nine Latin American countries for which we have data increased spending on education while simultaneously reducing the degree of state control over the economy (see Table 1).

Yet, the relationship suggested by Table 1 should be treated with caution; the numbers do not entirely refute the criticism that structural adjustment hurts education. Most Latin American nations in Table 1 experienced renewed growth in the 1990s, after a decade of stagnation, failed economic stabilization, and declines in social spending. They were bound to experience an expansion in social services in the 1990s. These examples do not reveal what happens to education when countries are fiscally ill (i.e., undergoing high budget deficits, recession, or capital outflow) and undergoing reform (i.e., in the midst of implementing of structural adjustment programs). Other research shows that when Latin American countries experienced budget deficits, their education spending declined (Huber, Mustillo, and Stephens, 2004). If the initial impact of an IMF stabilization program is a lower gross domestic product (GDP), as some argue (see Vreeland, 2003), then it is not

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unreasonable to conclude that structural adjustment, at least initially, may hurt education spending insofar as lower growth rates limit spending.

If evidence on the effects of structural adjustment on education is mixed, the second criticism—that loans earmarked for education are diverted—is increasingly persuasive. Multilaterals offer sound pro-education advice and plenty of resources; however, they have few ways of penalizing countries that fail to promote education. Nor do they have the capacity to monitor implementation. Without the capacity to monitor and sanction, it is hard to believe that multilaterals can exert much pressure on states. As de Moura Castro writes on the use of World Bank money, “all schools are built, most teachers are trained and computers purchased…but the reform component is not implemented” (2002: 395). In addition, although lavish in relation to other forms of aid and in relation to past aid, international aid on education generally accounts for less than 2 percent of the education budget of a recipient country (UNICEF, 1999: 81).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Change in SOE Economic Activity*</th>
<th>Change in SOE Investment*</th>
<th>Change in Expenditures on Education*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>-1.4</td>
<td>-6.3</td>
<td>0.52</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-3.1</td>
<td>2.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>-0.3</td>
<td>-4.9</td>
<td>2.1**</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
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<td>-8.8</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
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<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Mexico</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
<td>-6.2</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Source: Calculated using World Bank (Various Years); SOE data are based on the 2000 edition.

Notes:
* Change in SOE (State-owned Enterprise) Economic Activity is the difference between the average percent of GDP accounted for by SOEs in 1985–1990 and the average in the 1990–97 period. Change in SOE Investment is the difference between the average SOE investment as a percentage of GDI in 1985–1990 and the average in the 1990–97 period. Change in Expenditures on Education is the difference between the average education expenditures in the 1985–90 period and the average in the 1990–97 period.
** Data from Brazil prior to 1994, and from 1996 to 1998, are not available. The reported figure is the difference in percentage points between education spending in 1994 and 2000.
Hunter and Brown (2000) study the impact of World Bank lending on human-capital variables in thirteen Latin American countries between 1980 and 1992. They concur with de Moura Castro that the World Bank has not had a significant impact on human capital investment in Latin America. They find neither an upward trend in overall education spending corresponding to the beginning of the World Bank’s emphasis on education nor any redistribution of resources from tertiary to primary education, which is one of the Bank’s most insistent policy recommendations. Local institutional obstacles override the intentions and resources of the World Bank (Hunter and Brown, 2000).

Although important, Hunter and Brown’s finding that the World Bank’s efforts to promote education have little influence should also be taken with caution. The selected cases are idiosyncratic in at least two respects. First, these countries already had devoted substantial resources to education and had relatively high coverage. These countries were in the last, flatter stage of the S-curve. It makes sense to find low levels of World Bank influence at this late stage, when the cost of expanding schooling is high. It remains to be explored whether World Bank lending is more influential in countries at earlier points in the S-curve. This would make intuitive sense; in earlier stages, the cost of expansion is lower and World Bank support, always small, can have a larger impact. Second, Hunter and Brown’s cases were idiosyncratic in terms of the period studied—1980 to 1992—which includes the period of the debt crisis, which Edwards (1995) labels a time of “muddling through” policy-making. Except for Chile and Bolivia, most Latin American countries until the late 1980s eschewed major policy reforms for political reasons—their governments were either unstable dictatorships or nascent democracies fearful of generating regime-threatening instability. It could be that under less economically and politically precarious conditions, pro-education lending by the World Bank is more influential. Hunter and Brown’s study does not test this proposition.

The conclusion is therefore that poor domestic fiscal health is a worse enemy of education than any external actor. Countries in fiscal trouble require the intervention of external doctors (the IMF and the World Bank) whose medicines (structural adjustment) may depress social spending at first. Once recovery occurs, international organizations now recommend that states expand and reform social services, including education. Financial crises may also encourage states to recruit technical experts with training in economics, a preference for efficiency, and transnational ties (see Domínguez, 1997; Grindle, 1996). Insofar as states retain these internationally minded, reform-seeking technical experts, multilaterals retain a window through which they can influence states. In most instances, however, the influence of pro-education World Bank lending may be limited. This is especially true for countries expanding education to the last and most difficult to reach popula-

9. To determine World Bank lending, Hunter and Brown calculate the percentage of World Bank lending to Latin America disbursed to a specific country divided by the home country’s economic output, which is expressed as its share of the region’s GDP.
tions, or those experiencing severe economic crises and policy paralysis. It remains to be seen whether World Bank education lending has a more noticeable effect under different conditions, i.e., in countries at the middle stages of the S-curve and those suffering less intense political crises.

The Allure of Ideas

The spread of ideas is another mechanism that may create international pressure to expand education. The idea that education is a public good, in the national interest of every state, is one of the most significant paradigm shifts of the twentieth century (see Coleman, 1965: 3–32). Two centuries ago, most countries of the West considered education a privilege that only those already capable could appreciate and thus receive. Even as recently as the late 1970s, development experts did not agree about the economic benefits of education. As Simmons (1980) documents, some argued that the mass education of rural children would divert resources from investments with higher returns and also depopulate the countryside, creating an employment problem in the agricultural sector and an intractable unemployment problem in cities.10

Today, most political leaders, activists, and scholars embrace instead the idea that education is both a human right as well as a national good. Part of the reason for the shift in paradigm rests on the influential 1980 World Bank World Development Report. The report provided evidence that the expansion of schooling increased agricultural production and reduced fertility and mortality in developing countries. Education, the report showed, leads to smaller, healthier, more productive families in agricultural communities, and by extension, enhances development. Equally influential has been George Psacharopoulos’s work since 1973 on the private and social returns on educational investments. He shows that increased education of the labor force explains both increased returns to the individual, especially for the lowest-income individuals, and possibly a substantial part of growth in output, especially in developing countries. Investment in education “behaves in a more or less similar manner as investment in physical capital” (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004: 118).

Large international organizations and not-so-large non-governmental organizations have become strong advocates of education as, in the words of the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), both an individual right and a national good. This consensus at the international level is as consequential as two other paradigm shifts in the history of education in the West: the rise of humanism in the sixteenth century, which made erudition a virtue coveted by aristocrats, not just clergy; and the rise of social rights in the nineteenth century (see Marshall, 1964), which compelled European states to accept the idea of providing education services to citizens.

However, it is unclear whether this new consensus at the international level is equally strong within states. To test its presumed spread, Fiala and Lanford (1987) examine “formal expressions of national aims of education”

10. I thank Robert Levine for this insight.
among 125 countries from 1955 and 1965. They find a remarkable convergence: most governments cite the same set of reasons for providing education, top among which are the achievement of "national development," "economic development," and "individual development." For Fiala and Lanford, this is strong evidence of the existence of the new consensus across states. Yet Fiala and Lanford acknowledge that their study cannot prove that the consensus was more than empty promises made for the sake of appearances and that these ideas actually motivated educational expansion.

Ideas may not be all that influential because, to cause change to spread across borders, they need more than just many adherents. It is also necessary that ideas find: 1) transnational institutional mechanisms of diffusion (Slaughter, 2004; Simmons, 2001; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Haas, 1992; Keohane and Nye, 1989), 2) institutional penetration in a host country (Jacoby, 2000; Hall, 1989), and 3) strong empirical support, especially in a neighboring country (Weyland, 2005). The idea that education is a "national good" and an "individual right" certainly meets the first criterion (i.e., through the technical missions of international organizations or the openness of Western universities to international students who then return home), but it may not meet the second and third criteria.

For instance, it is not clear that institutional penetration in developing countries has occurred to any significant degree. Ministries of education are not necessarily staffed with experts committed to education, and even if a ministry of education is duly staffed, other more important ministries, such as finance, might react with skepticism (see Corrales, 1999). This skepticism about the value of education, particularly in ministries of finance, is partly rooted in the third criterion—empirical support. Although UNICEF declares that education "is a matter of morality, justice and economic sense" (1999: 7), there is not worldwide agreement that educational expansion always makes economic sense. Despite its benefits at the individual level, there is still no conclusive empirical evidence that education, in and of itself, is the best antidote for underdevelopment (see Easterly, 2002: 71–86). Hannum and Buchmann observe, “Controversy surrounds the proposition that investment in education results in measurable increments to growth in gross domestic product. The evidence is likewise ambiguous on whether education reduces social inequality and promotes democratization” (2003: iv). Even among believers in education, there is enormous disagreement about the most appropriate routes for expanding education (i.e., the proportion of state versus private investment, the proportion of investments in tertiary versus secondary education, the degree of decentralization).

In sum, the transnational diffusion of ideas is an important source of educational expansion. The latest ideas on the benefits of education reach countries around the world, and these ideas persuade many citizens and leaders. However, the message is not necessarily implanted in the crucial political institutions, and sometimes not even within the ministry of education. The political power of international ideas will remain limited as long as there is empirical disagreement about the economic payoffs of education.
Emulating or Surpassing Peers

International relations scholars have long emphasized that the pressures of international political competition may shape domestic outcomes. To some scholars, the presence of an external threat is key, as it may induce nations into “balancing”—attempting to match and surpass the achievements of a rival nation. This may apply to education expansion, since there are many important historical examples of military-political rivalry stimulating education: 1) educational expansion associated with competition between Protestant and Catholic areas of Europe during the Reformation; 2) the emulation by European nations of Prussia’s universal education of soldiers, to which some ascribed Prussia’s victory in the 1871 Franco-Prussian War; and, more recently, 3) the expansion of science and engineering education in the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.

However, in developing countries, this type of pressure seems less relevant. Among developing countries, external threats stem mostly from neighboring countries over border disputes. This type of dispute places a higher premium on military preparedness than on competition for status, which limits the competitive value of bolstering education. Emulation may occur, not only among international rivals, but also among mere status-seekers—nations that are trying to earn acceptance into a prestigious international community or institution (see Walt, 2000). For example, Southern Europe in the 1980s and Eastern Europe in the 1990s boosted education systems with a clear eye to earning the respect of, and thus membership in, the Western European community. This type of external pressure also seems less applicable to developing countries. For emulation to occur, a nation must come to value membership in a specific international community (see Jacoby, 2000). In addition, the target international community must also place a high value on the educational achievements of its members. Even the European Union, the most important example of a prestigious club with many aspiring members, places less emphasis on education than on other policy achievements (e.g., civil rights, human rights, economic development, and macroeconomic discipline). Few developing countries assign a high value to membership in communities that have education achievement as a standard of admission.

In sum, external pressures to expand education that arise from international rivalry or status-seeking seem to be less decisive than external pressures stemming from economic competition, which as discussed previously may not generate pressures for improvements in schooling.

STATE-BASED INCENTIVES

Promoting Nationalism and Loyalty to the State

The creation of loyalty to the state is a primary, if not the most urgent, task of every emerging nation. Since the time of Thomas Hobbes, we have known that states that do not command authority and respect from their citizens risk collapsing, possibly into civil war (see Kohli, 2002). Because they must gener-
ate loyalty, states have an interest in controlling the beliefs of citizens (see Pritchett, 2003). States may achieve this by promoting nationalism (see Linz and Stepan, 1996: 16–37) or by undermining the other entities in society that compete for the allegiance of citizens (e.g., religious organizations, tribal strongmen, or simple attachments to tradition or ethnicity). States have often promoted education vigorously because they see education as contributing to both the rise of nationalism and the weakening of rivals (see Benavot and Resnik, 2003).

There is little dispute that the desire to promote nationalism was a fundamental driver of educational expansion in newly independent states in the 1950s and 1960s, especially in Africa (see Sutton, 1965), just as it was in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe. State leaders wanted both for citizens to develop loyalties to the newly independent state and to compete with colonial powers—i.e., to prove to their citizens that they could do better than the colonial powers in the provision of services. Munishi (1995), for instance, argues that after independence the Tanzanian government aggressively pursued social-service expansion despite extremely limited funds. During the colonial period, only immigrants from Europe and Asia received high-quality government education in Africa (Makau, 1995); after independence, citizens expected to enjoy the services previously denied to them. To gain political legitimacy among many different tribes, the Tanzanian government, like other African governments, sought to reduce the authority of NGOs, to promote self-help initiatives, and to expand state services under a “socialist” philosophy akin to populism. The logic behind these initiatives was that citizens would pledge their allegiance to a government that could provide new social services, including education. By fomenting nationalism, the new government would gain legitimacy.

If promoting nationalism at the early stages of state formation is a strong enough incentive to expand education, we should observe more rapid expansion in newly independent states than in other scenarios. However, Meyer et al. (1977) examine this hypothesis and find no clear evidence that, in general, nations immediately post-independence increase education more vigorously than other countries. This finding does not necessarily negate that nationalism drives education expansion, but it does suggest that nationalism—or controlling beliefs in general—is a short-lived source of political energy for the expansion of education, too dependent on bottom-up levels of threat. As the memory of colonial governments recedes, the need to compete with these systems loses urgency.

Neutralizing Domestic Rivals

When the incentive to promote nationalism is combined with the incentive to neutralize allegiances to religion, strongmen, or just tradition, the impetus to expand education increases. In Western Europe, a fundamental push for the expansion of education occurred when states prioritized secularization and the modernization of citizens to make them more suitable for a “modern” industrial life. Another driver in the rise of mass education in nine-
teenth-century Europe was the desire of “national elites” to compete against local elites for the loyalties of local clients; and, even more fundamentally, the desire to incorporate into society the “vagrant poor”—viewed as always needy and mobile, and thus a potential threat to public security (de Swaan, 2001).

In the postwar period, totalitarian revolutionary regimes (e.g., the Soviet Union, China) combined hyper-nationalism with vigorous efforts to neutralize—even eliminate—strong domestic rivals. Lott (1999) shows that totalitarian regimes—the same regimes that seek to exercise monopoly over the media—spend more on education than other regimes. These regimes do not seem to spend more on health, which suggests a connection between educational expansion and the desire to control a society, rather than a concern for human wellbeing. Totalitarian states extensively expanded education precisely because of their intense commitment to the control of society and to breaking old allegiances (see Coleman, 1965: 227). Using qualitative methods, Cheng and Manning confirm that the feature that distinguished educational expansion in China and Cuba between 1957–1976 from expansion in other post-colonial societies over that period—and what made the effort far more intense—was the state’s desire to create a “classless community” and to generate a productivity breakthrough by imposing “voluntary” work on students (2003: 388–389).

In sum, regimes that have a strong desire—or capacity—to launch forceful attacks on traditional allegiances may also make a strong drive for education. However, except for the continued possibility of fundamentalist revolutions in the Islamic world, the incidence of revolutionary impulses has subsided worldwide. This may not be unfortunate. Revolutionary impulses come at a huge cost to human life, political liberty, and economic resources. Many democrats and humanists do not condone these efforts, however salutary they may be for educational expansion.

The insight remains that states interested in exacting control over citizens have a stronger motivation to expand education (Pritchett, 2003). This has troubling implications. First, there will be variation in the degree to which states pursue education provision: the more a state is control-seeking, the more it will pursue expansion.

Second, the extent to which a state wishes to exercise control depends in part on how threatened the state feels by societal groups. The existence of strong domestic rivals to state authority may encourage educational expansion, but this depends on the nature of the rival. If the rival is an armed actor, the state will boost military spending; if the rival is mostly ideological and cultural (i.e., the church, tradition, certain ideologies, surplus immigration), the state might focus more on education than on the military.

Third, where church-state relations are delicate or tense, states seem to pay more attention to education; however, the specific response has varied over time and among countries. For instance, Western European states used education to neutralize the power of the Catholic Church in three ways. One was to placate the religious authorities by granting them complete monopoly over educational services—the prevailing model in Catholic countries for the six-
teenth through early eighteenth centuries. In a later model, states offered mass schooling, thereby competing with the Church by providing a presumably cheaper, better, and more accessible education. This was the nineteenth-century model of the expansion of secondary education in Europe. A third option was to antagonize the Church directly by monopolizing education, akin to the secularist, revolutionary, totalitarian route of the twentieth century.

Developing countries that face similar challenges from strong religious groups have sometimes replicated these models (Coleman, 1965: 41–43). However, the most typical approach of these countries has been different: mutual assistance. In the Gulf monarchies, for example, massive educational expansion occurred in a form that was complementary to religious groups. The governments of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates officially endorse Islamic education for a number of reasons: it consolidates the partnership between the religious hierarchy and royal families; it allows countries to expand their cultural influence through Islamic university graduates; and it highlights the “pious” character of the state, creating a bulwark against radical Arabism and Iranian fundamentalism (Bahgat, 1998).

After the September 11 terrorist attacks, U.S. officials became convinced that the proliferation of Islamist schools in Islamic countries, without a commensurate development of secular schools, could pose a threat to international security—i.e., without a sufficient number of well-run secular schools, poor parents in Islamic countries send their children to Islamist schools, which can act as breeding grounds for fundamentalist thinking. The U.S. Agency for International Development thus increased education-related spending in Islamic countries (Perlez, 2003). The desire to defeat potential religious and traditionalist rivals to state authority—this time at the international level—again proved to be a major incentive for educational expansion.

Fourth, states that have less controlling ideologies or limited capabilities may falter on the provision of education. Specifically, states that feel that they can afford higher degrees of pluralism at home may be less inclined to invest in educational expansion because they are less interested in social control. If this holds true, then democracies, which by definition are more comfortable with dissent and pluralism, may be less driven to expand education than more controlling dictatorships. Universalization in these societies may only occur if societal demand is strong, as discussed below.

Fifth, states may hesitate to expand education out of a fear of generating instability. One common fear centers on the possible sociological outcome of more education, what I call the “Educated-Unemployed-Gramsci” phenomenon. This is the fear that rapid education will produce a mass of educated but unemployed citizens and lead to a plethora of “Gramscis”—a reference to Antonio Gramsci (1891–1937), a well-known Marxist theorist who escaped rural poverty through schooling, including university education, to become one of Italy’s most famous political agitators.11 As LeVine et al. (2001)

11. Fuller and Rubinson illustrate this argument by showing that conservative town-council leaders in nineteenth-century France “feared that mass schooling would feed rising social expectations held by the working class and rural peasants” (1992: 9).
explain, education plays a dual role in forming citizens. On the one hand, education creates literate citizens who are competent in communication, an outcome that most states would welcome for obvious reasons. However, education can also undermine traditionalist norms and empower challengers to the state, outcomes that governments may not welcome.

Another fear centers on the bureaucratic outcome of educational expansion. More education leads to more bureaucracy. Since Max Weber, many political scientists have assumed that bureaucracies are politically functional for rulers. Bureaucracies allow rulers to meet certain societal demands (see Tilly, 1992), to make societies “more legible”—to use Scott’s (1998) term—and thus more pacifiable, or to protect policies from the assaults of political adversaries (McCubbins et al., 1987). Yet there are times when rulers prefer not to build bureaucracies because they fear that political rivals will capture the bureaucracy and use it against them. This is precisely what Reno (2000) argues is happening in many African states, especially in Cameroon, Kenya, Zambia, Congo-Kinshasa, Congo-Brazzaville, and Uganda. Rulers are reducing investment in bureaucracies, and thus in education and other social services. Reno’s work concludes that, in the context of strong societal adversaries and hopelessly weak states, the rational strategy of rulers is to neglect investments in bureaucracy, because it both takes resources away from other means of dealing with adversaries and could ultimately be captured by rivals.

In conclusion, the degree of educational expansion may depend on variations in the strength of state capacities and ideologies, as well as the strength of societal rivals. Table 2 summarizes some possible combinations of these variables and the expected educational outcomes, with examples. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, most developing countries find themselves in quadrants II or III, where there is low drive for education. The exceptions are democratic Latin American and Asian countries, which might be reaching quadrant IV. In these countries, universalization and improvements in quality depend less on state-based incentives (which are weak in democracies) and more on the strength of societal demand—which varies across and within democracies.

**Clientelism**

In addition to neutralizing rivals, states must also repay those who provide political support. Rulers have always allowed or encouraged the use of state resources to reward citizens who render useful political services (Bates, 1981; Krueger, 1974; Buchanan and Tullock, 1967). The distribution of valued resources—tangible or intangible—according to political criteria is often called patronage (Pasquino, 1996). When patronage flows from a strong actor toward a weak actor, it is called clientelism (Stokes, 2000; Graziano, 1975; Scott, 1972). When funds or favors are illegally exchanged between economically powerful actors and public officials, misaligning the public interest and the interest of the public official, it is called corruption (see Rose-Ackerman, 1998).

Clientelism, patronage, and corruption are three of the most intense political forces that push states to expand education. It is clear why education...
lends itself to patronage. As Rose-Ackerman (1998) argues, patronage flourishes around large government activities, such as investments in infrastructure. Education qualifies as a large government activity.

Patronage and clientelism can aid educational expansion also by protecting social spending in poor countries during periods of economic contraction. Brown and Hunter (1999) find that poor democracies of Latin America, which are arguably more susceptible to patronage and clientelism, are less likely than authoritarian regimes to cut social spending when faced with rising debt burdens, slower growth, and budget deficits. These effects dissipate as income rises, however. In more developed countries, there is no clear difference in the extent to which different regime types protect social spending.

As a mechanism for expanding education, clientelism carries with it undesirable baggage. It is the main explanation for the tendency of public school systems to be more inefficient (i.e., have a higher input-to-output ratio) than private school systems within the same country: private schools invest more on classroom-based inputs such as instructional materials and teacher incentives, whereas public schools invest in external resources such as wages and procurement (Jiménez and Lockheed, 1995). The latter are typically driven by patronage. Although there are exceptions—mostly in Southeast Asia—of corruption co-existing with relatively efficient school systems, corruption more frequently goes hand in hand with misguided educational investment.

First, clientelism drives the state to expand public employment without demanding that public employees fulfill their responsibilities. In this way, patronage undermines the legitimacy of government and politicians, magnifies the power of vested interests, lowers the quality of services provided by the state, and erodes the impact of social policies. Patronage may protect
spending on salaries but not the expenditures necessary for effective education (e.g., training, facilities, infrastructure maintenance).

Second, corruption may deplete overall resources, leaving less for investment. In a quantitative study of corruption—a proxy of patronage—Gupta et al. (2000) find not only that corruption depletes overall resources, but also that corruption increases the cost of and lowers the output provided by lower levels of government and social services, especially in the health and education sectors. By decreasing the quality of government services, corruption depresses the demand for such services. Combining different indices of corruption (i.e., perceptions among investors of uncertainty and unpredictability about laws, policies, and regulations), Gupta et al. find that countries with lower indices of corruption have 26 percent fewer student dropouts at the primary level.

Third, corruption hurts educational expansion because it distorts the composition of government expenditure. A landmark report by the IMF showed that corrupt governments, which presumably find it easier to hide the diversion of funds, spend less on education and more on public investment (Mauro, 1996). A country that reduces corruption will typically simultaneously raise its spending on education (Mauro, 1996).

Finally, clientelism also operates from the bottom up: local politicians commit the national government to spend more on education (e.g., building more schools) without securing revenue for maintaining the facilities. The result can be an expansion of physical resources followed by quick decay of facilities.

Several qualitative studies show the close connection between clientelism and inefficient education systems. Plank (1990) shows that in the democratic administration of Brazilian President José Sarney, governors who supported a five-year term for the president were showered with federal monies for their states, while governors who supported a four-year term received little money. Textbook monopolies were granted to specific publishing firms, also as an exchange of favors and not according to a judgment of quality or price bidding. Mainwaring (1999b: 213) finds that in the state of Bahia in northeast Brazil, which has an illiteracy rate of almost 50 percent, an estimated 37,000 teachers on the public payroll as of early 1987 had never taught a single class. A case study of the Indian state of West Bengal shows that political connections dictate whether a teacher will or will not be reprimanded for poor performance and also discourage the government from holding schools accountable (Ruud, 1999). Researchers making unannounced visits to schools in India found that a school’s inability to monitor or to sanction may explain the finding that, on average, schoolchildren receive one minute of individual attention per day from a teacher (PROBE Team, 1999) and that one in four teachers is absent on any given day (Kremer et al., 2004).

In short, patronage and clientelism are double-edge swords. On the one hand, they can be the main drivers of educational expansion in developing

12. Like patronage, corruption constitutes the channeling of public resources for private gains. In addition, patronage and corruption tend to go together (see Stokes, 2000; Mainwaring, 1999b).
countries. On the other hand, except in some Southeast Asian countries, patronage and clientelism—and accompanying corruption—can present major threats to the quality and efficiency of education. These costs may mitigate any gains in educational expansion.

_Incentives to Increase Efficiency_

Ideally, a government will want not just to expand education, but to expand education efficiently. If patronage is the prevailing incentive to states to provide education, however, the public education system will be plagued by inefficiency and inattention to quality. In a patronage scenario, it is more convenient to expand coverage (e.g., build new schools or add teachers to the payroll), which involves spending money to co-opt political actors, than to fix inefficiencies, which may involve taking resources away from underperforming actors.

Estimating inefficiency rates in a school system is difficult, even if one accepts Simmons’s commonsensical definition of efficiency: “the optimum combination of inputs such as teacher training and expenditure per student to achieve at least-cost the desired outcome, such as a certain level of reading achievement” (Simmons, 1980: 10). The problem is that estimates vary depending on the outcome that a school is asked to deliver—a decision that teachers and parents often disagree on—and more important, student or community characteristics that vary across schools and classrooms. For example, a school whose students are mostly poor, foreign-language speaking, recent immigrants will require more resources than a school with children from middle- or upper-class families, but this does not mean that it is less efficient.

Nevertheless, there is ample evidence dating back to the 1970s that rates of school inefficiency are greater in developing countries than in developed countries. Simmons (1980) reaches this conclusion by comparing “wastage rates,” which compare the level of investment in relation to several education outputs. These outputs include dropout rates (i.e., desertions based on student’s volition), pushout rates (i.e., desertions based on school action), and repetition rates. Although scholars might disagree on the amount of inefficiency, there is agreement that high wastage rates are pervasive in developing countries. This inefficiency probably accounts for the finding by Alesina (1997) that spending on public education—and public health, public employment and social security—often is nonprogressive in favoring well-off communities, fails to reach the poor, and implies distortions, especially in Latin America, Africa, and rural areas.

One possible incentive for states to increase efficiency in education is the desire to create savings. Cash-strapped states have much to gain by increasing the efficiency of schools, spending less money to achieve similar or better outcomes. In the 1990s, many states developed a historically unusual preference for savings, including lower debts, deficits, and inflation rates. This heightened concern for savings and efficiency in social services, a shift resulting from internationally circulated and accepted ideas, has significantly impacted the propensity of states to pay attention to educational issues.
Ministers of finance with a strong preference for savings typically become key political actors pushing for efficiency.

However, pro-efficiency forces at the state level are typically counterbalanced by other state leaders who fear that taking resources away from current beneficiaries will generate political conflict (see Robinson, 1998). These fears, typical of politicians dependent on patronage relationships, can block measures designed to increase efficiency. If ministers of finance do not see a way to maximize efficiency, they may become reluctant to endorse increases in spending in education, which may in turn prevent universalization.

The politics of pushing for efficiency thus involve conflict at the state level, usually pitting three cabinet-level actors against each other: 1) savings-oriented ministers of finance who block education spending unless accompanied by efficiency gains; 2) ministers of education who may desire efficiency, but who also want far more spending than finance ministers allow; and 3) patronage-seeking ministers who care less about generating savings than about keeping crucial political constituents happy with state largess (see Corrales, 2004a; 2004b).

Conflict will not be confined to state actors. Other involvement will depend on at least two variables: overall GDP, which determines the country’s available resources, and the existing level of efficiency. Colclough and Al-Samarrai (2000) offer a useful framework for understanding the inter-relationship between these two factors, as well as their policy implications. In a study of education in Africa and South Asia, they show that countries vary enormously in terms of GDP level and one possible proxy of inefficiency—unit cost of education (measured in terms of spending per student). Although the reason for variation in unit costs (not just within Africa, but across developing countries) remains to be explained, we can nonetheless use Colclough and Al-Samarrai’s work to generate some hypotheses about expected political conflicts.

As Colclough and Al-Samarrai note, the ideal policy prescription for a given country depends both on a country’s GDP and the unit cost of education (see Table 3). For countries that have high unit costs and relatively high GDP per capita (quadrant I), the policy imperative is to cut costs and spend more. If the country has a low GDP per capita (quadrant II) and high unit

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13. The use of unit cost as a measure of efficiency is open to criticism, as unit costs are blind to variations in the needs of different communities. However, for the purpose of this paper, unit costs serve as a useful measure of efficiency in considering how variations in a country’s overall income and efficiency determine the recommended educational policies, and consequently, the expected political conflict.

14. For higher income countries, Table 3 could be modified to reflect differences in fiscal health, rather than GDP levels. Fiscally stable countries have more resources to invest in education, and so their politics of education reform will resemble quadrants I and III; countries in fiscal trouble will exhibit the politics of quadrants II and IV.

15. Again, analysts might disagree with this recommendation. It could very well be that addressing inefficiency may require an increase in investment (e.g., improve infrastructure facilities, provide better training for teachers, etc.), at least in the short term.
costs, the policy imperative is to cut costs, of course, and also to stimulate economic growth and borrow more. If the country has low unit costs and high GDP per capita (quadrant III), the policy imperative is simply to spend more (i.e., cutting costs is unnecessary). Finally, a country with low unit costs and low GDP per capita (quadrant IV) will need to focus first on generating economic growth, in order to be able to afford spending on education. Each of these four policy prescriptions may generate different types of political conflict.

Unquestionably, countries that need to cut costs will face the harshest political problems. Typically, high unit costs result from relatively high teacher salaries. Because it is often difficult or inadvisable to cut teacher salaries, states must use alternative mechanisms to generate savings, such as increasing the student-teacher ratio or introducing more flexibility in the labor market for teachers, etc. These types of changes are not generally favored by unions, and as a result the politics of cutting costs will likely generate strong conflicts between states and teachers’ unions.

Table 3: Unit Costs, GNP levels, and the Politics of Education Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GNP per capita</th>
<th>Medium (&gt; US$300)</th>
<th>Very small (&lt;US$300)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Primary Unit Costs as a proportion of GNP per capita* | I. Policy Imperative: cut costs, increase spending  
Examples: Kenya, Senegal, Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Mauritania, Pakistan  
Expected political problem: unions | II. Policy imperative: cut costs, stimulate growth, borrow, and spend more  
Examples: Burundi, Mozambique, Ethiopia  
Expected political problem: unions, politicians, and intra-cabinet |
| High  
12% or higher; avg = 21% | | |
| Low  
11% or lower; avg = 7% | III. Policy Imperative: Increase education spending  
Examples: Zambia, Ghana, Central African Republic  
Expected political problem: If deficit and debts are large, the IMF and finance ministers will oppose new spending. | IV. Policy Imperative: Increase growth and borrow money  
Examples: Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zaire, Malawi, Chad, Gambia, Tanzania, Bangladesh  
Expected political problem: Debate among cabinet members about how to stimulate growth |

Source: Based on Colclough and Al-Samarrai (2000).

Note: * High unit-cost countries include countries whose current primary and pre-primary education spending per pupil is higher than the sub-Saharan Africa average (12 percent of GNP per capita). Low unit-cost countries are those whose current primary and pre-primary education spending per pupil is below the region’s average.
If GDP levels happen to be low (quadrant II), conflict will occur, not just between the state and unions but also among leading politicians. The need to generate income and to stimulate growth will cause serious debates throughout the whole political spectrum, as all actors will have different views about the amount of debt to assume and the policies that will produce growth. Tensions between ministries of finance and education, within the ruling party, and between the ruling party and opposition forces are almost guaranteed.

If unit costs are low, politics may be less contentious. This is especially true if GDP per capita is high (quadrant III). However, even in this scenario, the possibility of a serious political conflict may develop between the state and the IMF if an increase in spending hurts macroeconomic stability.

**SOCIETY-BASED DEMAND FOR EDUCATION**

One of the strongest explanations for the rise of state-provided services—the welfare state—comes from the “politics of contention” school of thought. This school posits that a state will forego the provision of services unless citizens bargain with, and in fact pressure, the state. Some political scientists go as far as to claim that education is mostly a citizen-driven phenomenon (e.g., Craig, 1981). Although this may be an overstatement, there is no question that household demand is crucial for educational expansion, as opposed to services such as health, where demand is universal and context-independent (Levine et al., 2003: 11).

Some of the factors that influence societal demand are intuitive. For example, other pressing social crises may draw a society’s attention and resources away from educational services. Even though citizens want educational expansion, they may not prioritize education before other issues (e.g., crime, unemployment, corruption). Kaufman and Nelson (2004), for instance, demonstrate that although Latin Americans prioritize education, it usually comes in second relative to issues such as crime or unemployment.

Other factors affecting demand are more complex and are related to a society’s bargaining capacity. Even when societal actors have a strong preference for more education, demand may falter if societal actors lack the capacity to pressure of the state. This section discusses five factors that may shape a society’s bargaining capacity: income, organization, information, ideologies, and competitive politics.

*Income and Organization as Enablers of Expansion*

Income and organization are probably the two most important factors that explain a society’s capacity for bargaining, although neither is a sufficient or an unambiguously positive force. Most studies of educational expansion find that income is the most important driver for at least three reasons. First, a higher aggregate income level allows states to invest more in education, although it is important to note that expenditure on education alone is not sufficient to produce universal coverage (UNDP, 2003; World Bank, 2003).
Second, as family income increases, the ability or willingness of citizens to temporarily forgo income to continue their education also increases. This explains why higher national income levels lead to increased societal demand for education. Third, income whets the state’s appetite for taxes. In the effort to capture more taxes while retaining citizens’ loyalty, states might feel more compelled to negotiate with citizens, thereby giving rise to social services.

Low income in general is the most significant barrier to educational expansion; the poorer the country, the more difficult it is for other policy interventions (e.g., increases in public expenditures on education) to compensate for the drag effect of low income (Clemens, 2004).

On an individual level, low-income parents making decisions about their child’s education must consider not only the actual cost of schooling but also the opportunity costs, such as the foregone income from a child’s labor. The opportunity cost of attending school may be higher in rural areas, but there is no question that poverty—more so than rural lifestyle—is the most significant deterrent of parental demand for schooling and the primary factor leading to desertion. Buchmann and Brakewood (2000) find that impoverished subsistence farmers in Thailand are less likely than wealthier counterparts to send their children to school. Similarly, they find that much wealthier cash crop farmers in Kenya are more likely to send their children to school.

Where schooling is costly, low-income families are often forced to strategize in a way that limits demand for education. In rural Nepal, for example, it is a common for poor households to trade the further education of one son for the schooling of other sons (Ashby, 1985). The most promising son pursues a high level of education, while the others forgo school to help with work at home. The educated son is then expected to use his education to benefit his family. In an age-adjusted survey, Ashby finds that, in 83 percent of Nepalese families, at least one son obtained greater schooling than his brothers.

Lack of income can be an obstacle to educational expansion where households derive a significant portion of their income from child labor. Myron Weiner’s book on child labor in India makes the alarming argument that in societies ravaged by poverty, where households rely on child labor for income, sending children to school entails substantial foregone income (Weiner, 1991). Parents, therefore, are reluctant to release children from work to send them to school. Fuller and Rubinson (1992) take this argument further. They argue that during the early stages of industrialization, when demand for child labor is large, parental demand for schooling may decline precisely because sending children to school represents foregone income. Where schools are in disrepair, or where education is of poor quality, parental reluctance to send children to school increases (PROBE, 1999), because the perceived economic returns to education are low. The successful provision of two public goods, education and termination of child labor, is constrained by their direct cost to households.

In a chapter that compares India to Western Europe, Weiner develops the argument that educational expansion will occur after societies have undergone a major cultural shift: when parents stop seeing children as assets, gen-
erating income for older household members, and begin to consider them more as liabilities, the recipients of income from the older household members (1991: 114). Only households in the latter category are prepared to release their children from child labor to education.

The best sign that this transition—from children being considered assets to being considered liabilities—has occurred is a demographic shift toward smaller families. Weiner’s argument leads to the hypothesis that educational expansion is more likely in countries whose fertility rates have declined, not so much because a small student population makes state services less costly, but because the fertility decline is a proxy of parental willingness to send children to school (i.e., a sign that they have changed how they view children). This argument can explain the enrollment successes of East Asian economies. Between 1965 and 1989, these countries experienced dramatic declines in the school-age population followed by dramatic achievements in secondary enrollment (see Table 4).

The question is, then, what comes first—demographic change or educational expansion? It is possible that the direction of causality changes depending on the stage of educational expansion. In the early stages, minimal provision of education seems necessary to spark demographic change. Research shows that small increases in the education stock of the population—namely, increases in female literacy rates—generate a substantial decrease in birth rates (see Hannum and Buchmann, 2003). Once this process is underway (i.e., after birth rates have begun to decline rapidly), then the direction of causality changes. Demographic change triggers educational expansion along the lines

Table 4: Declines in School-Age Population and Enrollment Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>School-age (0–14) Population as a Percentage of Total Population</th>
<th>Secondary Enrollment (Percent Gross)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1965</td>
<td>1989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>East Asian</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea, Rep. of</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Others</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

hypothesized by Weiner, where declining birth rates are associated with greater parental demand for education and lower marginal costs of educational provision.

This two-stage hypothesis linking education and demographic change might explain the education achievements of the Indian state of Kerala. By 1990, Kerala had one of the highest levels of human development, especially literacy, in all of India. One of the reasons for Kerala’s success in education could very well be the early expansion of female literacy. By the early 1930s, the three provinces that compose present-day Kerala (Trancavore, Cochin, and Malabar) had achieved female literacy rates that were far above the Indian average (see Table 5). As the two-stage hypothesis would predict, major demographic changes soon followed (see Drèze and Sen, 1995); by the 1950s, birth rates in Kerala were declining at a faster rate than the national average. By the early 1970s, the birth rate in Kerala was 31.6 per 1,000 relative to 36.8 per 1,000 for all of India.

The two-stage literacy-demography argument seems plausible for Kerala, but it is not conclusive. In Kerala, the literacy-demography variable coexisted with another social variable that may have had an equally strong impact on schooling: heightened political competition (see Appendix 1). Historical competition among religious communities, post-independence competition among political parties, and other strong and contending societal organizations also contributed to Kerala’s strong performance in expanding education.

Raising income levels and reducing the opportunity costs of education, however, might not be necessary to propel the state to provide the needed educational expansion. Even materially deprived citizens can force states to provide services if they become politically organized, for example in political

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Circa</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Kerala*</th>
<th>Trancavore**</th>
<th>Cochin</th>
<th>Malabar</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Kerala</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td></td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>45.2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td></td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>39.9</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td></td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>37.0**</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>38.9</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td></td>
<td>24.9</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Female literacy rates from Jeffrey (1992: 60); birth rates from Ramachandran (2000: 48).

Notes: * The state Kerala formed in 1956 with the union of Trancavore, Cochin, and Malabar. ** The state Trancavore-Cochin formed in 1949
parties, labor unions, or other organizations for parents or communities.

Studying developed countries, Swank (2002) finds that those organized along corporatist lines (i.e., numerous unions with collective negotiations between the government and unions) have resisted the retrenchment of welfare services that may result from the pressures of globalization. In Latin America, scholars attribute the push for education in the region to populist political parties and teachers’ unions, which were strong in the postwar period. In Africa, where parties and unions are weaker relative to those in Latin America, societal bargaining leverage vis-à-vis the state has been lower, which explains in part Africa’s slower educational expansion. However, the absence of strong parties and unions is not necessarily an insurmountable handicap. Although parties and unions are weak in Africa, parent and community organizations are strong in some countries (e.g., Kenya); this contributes to educational expansion.

In short, states will deliver services when societal actors have the income or the organization to bargain with the state. This argument helps to explain the steepest part of the S-curve. Once the state offers a minimal amount of education, mechanisms that lead to self-sustaining pressures are set in motion. The result is a virtuous cycle: state investments in human capital increase the income of citizens and draw them to cities. Wealthier, more urbanized citizens are then more inclined to organize, which increases pressure on the state to deliver even more education.

This argument might also explain the flattening of the S-curve after a certain income threshold is reached. Because income and urbanization, and thus organization, do not spread across society uniformly—with the persistence of poverty in rural communities and in marginalized ghettos—there will be some demand failures. The poor and the unorganized may fail to strongly petition the state, resulting in large underserved communities. Because the two ingredients needed for the occurrence of effective bargaining—income and organization levels—are typically low or highly unevenly distributed in developing countries, societal demand for education may falter. The central tragedy is that those who would profit the most from universal education—i.e., the households who will obtain the highest returns from education, namely, low income groups in low-income countries (see Psacharopolous and Patrinos, 2004)—are those least likely to be politically organized to make effective demands.

It is important to note that this argument has limits. It cannot explain why some countries, even ones that are comparatively wealthy and that have organized citizens, encounter serious difficulties in providing universal and efficient educational coverage. It does not account for the underachievers, an indication that there may be a negative side effect to income and organization.

**Income and Organization As Obstacles to Expansion**

Under certain conditions, income may stand in the way of educational expansion. High-income groups, for instance, can skew public spending on education to the detriment of lower-income groups, because they have either more
resources to spend arranging for government benefits or more bargaining power due to the higher level of tax revenue they generate (see Gradstein, 2003). One notable indication of the stranglehold that high-income groups have on educational services in the developing world can be found in the treatment of university systems. In developing countries, universities are frequently overfunded in relation to secondary and primary education and simultaneously underfunded in terms of resources invested in research and development. The result is a heavily subsidized service grant to the middle classes (see UNICEF, 1999: 63; Birdsall, 1996).

As Figure 3 shows, countries with the lowest primary completion rates tend to have the highest proportion of spending on university (measured as tertiary education spending per student as a percent of GDP per capita). This suggests that the countries with the greatest need to improve primary education may be constrained by the disproportionate amount they spend on university services. Where this is the case, a country must sacrifice some spending on university services to improve primary coverage. Typically, however, beneficiaries of the university system tend to reject the shift in resources. Throughout Latin America, for instance, attempts to free up resources for primary and secondary education by imposing fees on university students have met with massive protests (Hunter and Brown, 2000).

Organized interest groups can also obstruct educational expansion. One well-known argument posits that organized groups pursue policies that

![Figure 3: University Spending versus Primary Completion Rates in Developing Countries, circa 2001.](source)

Source: World Bank (Various Years).
Note: Values are for 2001 or the most recent prior year for which data are available.
divert resources to themselves, rather than the public good (Olson, 1965). For example, in developed countries, resistance may come from pensioners. Studies have found correlations between large elderly populations and lower education spending, in part because the elderly are well organized and participate politically to protect their benefits. Because most elderly individuals no longer work, they also resist new taxes, which may block educational expansion. The tendency for elderly populations to drive down educational spending has been found on the state level in the United States and on the national level (as the average age of the population increases) in countries such as Norway (Ladd and Murray, 2001; Poterba, 1997; Falch and Rattso, 1997).

This also applies directly to labor unions. McGuire (1999) finds a negative correlation between labor union strength and several human-development indices in East Asia and Latin America, including infant survival and life expectancy. Unions, together with actors representing better-off urban groups, often induce governments to enact policies that favor the urban and formal sectors to the detriment of both the rural and urban poor. There is reason to believe that in some instances unions may have a similarly obstructive influence on educational expansion, shifting resources away from inputs that promote education (see Pritchett and Filmer, 1997).

The influence of unions probably depends on how much educational expansion a country has already achieved. In the early stages of educational expansion, teachers’ unions are crucial societal advocates of educational expansion. More schools necessitate more teachers, which means stronger, larger unions. This is one reason that unions promote educational expansion, and maybe even better learning (see Zegarra and Ravina, 2003). However, in the latter stages, especially if economic conditions are threatening to unions (e.g., overall austerity, declining wages), their preference for educational expansion is replaced by a preference for self-protective policies such as limiting spending to teacher wages, rejecting merit pay or teacher evaluations, and opposing changes designed to generate savings. The self-protective demands of teachers can lead to strikes, which can in turn block educational expansion, generate inefficiencies, and even hurt student performance (see Murillo et al., 2002).

Scholars have examined the conditions that determine whether teachers’ unions become cooperative or obstructionist with reform efforts. An important and consistent finding, based mostly on Latin American cases, is that a union’s cooperation is shaped by three factors: how threatening the context is to the teachers’ union, especially salary levels and salary increases (see Umansky, 2005); the loyalty links between unions and parties (see Burgess, 1999); and the level of union professionalization (see Crouch, 2005).

Table 6 shows expected union response under four combinations of different economic contexts and loyalty links to political parties. When the economic context is favorable (e.g., teachers’ salaries are increasing) and ties to the ruling political party are strong, unions act cooperatively, focusing mostly on obtaining salary demands (quadrant I). If ties to the ruling party are weak or hostile (quadrant III), state-union cooperation erodes, but not severely.
The real problem occurs if the economic and policy contexts are threatening to unions (e.g., austerity measures, stagnated salary levels, or policies that mitigate the power of unions). Under such conditions, if the unions and the ruling party lack historical ties (quadrant IV), the likely result is confrontation between the state and unions, possibly leading to a paralyzing political crisis in the education sector. If the unions and the ruling party have historical ties, the likely result is a split among labor, which will be divided on how much to negotiate or challenge the state (see Tiramonti, 2001).

Murillo (2001) focuses on the politics of quadrant II. In a threatening economic context (austerity and market reform) in which leading unions have strong ties with the ruling party, two additional variables shape union response: intra-union and inter-union partisan competition. If there is little internal competition for leadership positions, union leaders will be more cooperative. If competition is stiff, union leaders heighten their confrontation with the government.

**Information**

Generating societal demand for education—among both high-income and low-income groups—often requires public awareness of the effectiveness (or ineffectiveness) of the educational system. In its summary of many years of theoretical work in economics and political science, the World Bank's *World Development Report 2004* makes the compelling argument that both the quantity and quality of social services depend on the accountability relationship between clients (e.g., in the case of education, parents) and the providers (e.g., school administrators). Accountability requires information. Without clear data on the delivery, quality, and outcomes of educational services, it is difficult for users, administrators, and external observers to make fair evaluations, diagnoses, and prescriptions (Bloom, 2004). Users who lack information about educational choices may simply forgo petitioning for needed services or may make weak, unrealistic, or nonspecific demands that are unlikely to be heeded. Evidence suggests that when citizens are informed of the failings of a particular education system, they can compel politicians to pay attention to the education sector (Reimers and McGinn, 1997). In short, without information, demand for more or better education will falter.

**Table 6: Economic and Policy Context, Links with Ruling Party, and Teacher’s Union Response**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Links with Ruling Party</th>
<th>Economic Context or Policy Type</th>
<th>Economic Context or Policy Type</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Non-threatening to Teachers’ Unions</td>
<td>Threatening to Teachers’ Unions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>I. Cooperation, discussion will focus on wages</td>
<td>II. Conflict, unions may split</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak or Hostile</td>
<td>III. Less cooperation, more strikes</td>
<td>IV. Potential for severe political crisis, unions may unite against the state</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
One of the most astonishing ironies in the field of development is that education, the area of state activity most concerned with increasing knowledge among the young, is also an area where the state is keenly reluctant to provide information to adults. The UNDP (2003) found that trend data on information as basic as “net primary enrollment ratio” and “children reaching grade five” are lacking in 46 percent and 96 percent of countries, respectively—17 percent and 46 percent of countries, respectively, lack any data whatsoever.16

Information is needed on more than just inputs, such as enrollment and attendance (Bloom, 2004). Measuring outputs such as academic attainment is indispensable. A comparison of poor schools in Chile showed that schools with effective diagnostic tests and systematic monitoring of teacher and student performance achieved higher test scores (Raczysnki and Muñoz, 2004). Yet few developing offer these diagnostic tests, and even fewer participate in international testing programs or conduct adequate local testing. One region that has made significant progress in measuring student performance is Latin America; in the 1990s, most nations in this region developed specialized agencies to administer, analyze and disseminate the results of student tests. Some of these agencies acquired a level of institutional strength sufficient to carry out these tasks, in terms of budgets, cadre of technical experts, and legal autonomy (see Ferrer, 2005). However, it seems that for the most part, these institutional efforts have not bolstered societal demand for more or better education. The reason could be that even in these cases, the data released to the public are still somewhat restricted, which makes it impossible for citizens to make use of available information.17

Ideological Competition

Educated elites can advocate for underserved populations, stimulating grassroots demand for education. This may occur as a result of the rise of certain ideologies. If Blyth (2003) is correct in arguing that ideas “change interests” and serve as “weapons in political struggles that help agents achieve their ends,” then the acceptance of the education-for-all idea matters not so much because it changes the preferences of states, but because it empowers citizens to place greater demands on the state. Paulston (1977) summarizes a number of arguments that emphasize the importance of “cultural revitalization movements.” These are movements of well-to-do citizens who seek to develop a more “satisfying culture.” The premise is that elite citizens become disillusioned with the societal status quo, in particular with inequities in the distribution of benefits, and feel that improvements are both possible and urgent.18

16. These include developing countries, Central and Eastern European countries, and members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. A country is defined as having trend data if at least two data points are available—one between 1990 and 1995 and one between 1996 and 2001—and if the two points are at least three years apart.

17. To the author’s knowledge, only Chile provides data that is disaggregated enough—by school—to be useful to parents.

18. This may explain why many radical anti-establishment movements often attract elites, including highly educated citizens, to their ranks and leadership positions. For a recent dis-
If this argument is correct, then one should expect to find that high levels of inequality in a particular society give rise to revitalization ideologies among elites, and thus increase political pressure for universal education. As elites become more outraged at inequality, their demands for attention to the problem increase. This might explain the surprising finding of Clemens (2004) that the more unequally education is distributed in a particular society, the faster its rate of educational expansion tends to be. It is also consistent with the claim of Kaufman and Stallings (1991) that in post-war Latin America the expansion of state spending tends to increase in highly unequal societies. Although this expansion occurs along populist lines and not according to efficiency or need, it is consistent with the finding that inequality compels the “haves” to do something, however flawed, for the “have-nots.”

**Electoral Politics**

Competition for political office may also enhance societal pressures for more and better education. In a democracy, beneficiaries of education and other social services compete among themselves to control state institutions. This competition results in alliances across society, and can make education an electoral issue. Candidates may be forced to make promises on education, and maybe even to deliver on such promises. Jensen (2003) and Shefter (1994) show how electoral competition among U.S. political parties generated expansion of social rights (e.g., services for revolutionary war veterans in the early nineteenth century, and citizenship for immigrants in New York in the 1930s). In theory, then, democracy or strong competition for office can generate pressures for the expansion of social services, including education.

The best example of the democracy-favors-education argument may be that of Costa Rica (see also the case of Kerala, described in Appendix 1). Unusual among developing countries, Costa Rica has been uninterruptedly democratic since 1949, with fairly competitive electoral politics, stable political parties, and almost negligible military spending. Despite its small size, relatively undiversified economy, modest income levels, and rural-urban inequality (see Muller and Seligson, 1987), Costa Rica achieved an impressive education record early on. By 1990, Costa Rica’s literacy and primary enrollment rates were among the highest in the world (see Mesa-Lago, 2000). As of 2000, its literacy rates remained among the highest in Latin American countries and far above the average for countries in its income category (Table 7).

If democracy facilitates educational expansion, then the conditions for achieving universal education are stronger than ever, because the number of democracy is historically high. In 1974, there were fewer than 40 democratic countries in the world. In 2002, there were 121—three of every five countries.

Yet the spread of civil and political liberty has not led to across-the-board improvement in education (World Bank, 2003). Costa Rica, for example, cussion of how contemporary terrorist organizations (the Hezbollah’s militant wing and Palestinian suicide bombers) recruit from both advantaged and disadvantaged groups in terms of both income and education levels, see Krueger and Malečková, 2003.
does not have impressive secondary enrollment rates (Table 7). The role of democracy in educational expansion may be limited because certain institutional problems, what Keefer and Khemani (2003) call “political market imperfections” can impair the capacity of citizens to demand more social services from the state.

First, the marginal cost of expanding a social service to all citizens—rather than just to the majority needed to win office—may at some point surpass the marginal political benefit obtained by including potential voters. Championing services for the very poor might allow a politician to build a large political base, but to prevail he or she need only obtain the support of

Table 7: Education Achievements in Costa Rica, Relative to Its Peers, 2000

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GDP Per Capita (Constant 1995 US$)</th>
<th>Illiteracy Rates (Percent of people ages 15 and above)</th>
<th>School enrollment, secondary (net enrollment rate)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rank (a) Country</td>
<td>Value Rank Country</td>
<td>Value Rank Country</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Argentina 38</td>
<td>8173.84 1 Trin and Tob 1.71 1 Argentina 79.06</td>
<td>1 Trin and Tob 1.71 1 Argentina 79.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Uruguay 47</td>
<td>6419.96 2 Uruguay 2.44 2 Chile 74.52</td>
<td>2 Uruguay 2.44 2 Chile 74.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Chile 53</td>
<td>5304.45 3 Argentina 3.17 3 Trin and Tob 72.16</td>
<td>3 Argentina 3.17 3 Trin and Tob 72.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Trin and Tob 39(c)</td>
<td>5270.02 4 Chile 4.24 4 Uruguay 69.93</td>
<td>4 Chile 4.24 4 Uruguay 69.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper-Middle</td>
<td>4888.00 5 Costa Rica 4.44 5 Brazil 69.23</td>
<td>5 Costa Rica 4.44 5 Brazil 69.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Brazil 33</td>
<td>4626.34 6 Paraguay 6.73 Upper Middle 68.61</td>
<td>6 Paraguay 6.73 Upper Middle 68.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Costa Rica 51</td>
<td>3911.17 7 Venezuela 7.46 6 Bolivia 67.34</td>
<td>7 Venezuela 7.46 6 Bolivia 67.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Mexico 12</td>
<td>3810.04 8 Panama 8.13 7 Peru (d)</td>
<td>8 Panama 8.13 7 Peru (d)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Panama 22</td>
<td>3483.67 9 Colombia 8.37 8 Panama 60.35</td>
<td>9 Colombia 8.37 8 Panama 60.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Venezuela 44</td>
<td>3301.14 10 Ecuador 8.44 9 Mexico 58.22</td>
<td>10 Ecuador 8.44 9 Mexico 58.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Peru 45</td>
<td>2334.41 Upper-Middle 9.00 10 Colombia 56.54</td>
<td>11 Colombia 9.46 Upper-Middle 9.00 10 Colombia 56.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Colombia 62</td>
<td>2288.99 11 Mexico 9.46 11 Venezuela 55.32</td>
<td>12 Dom. Rep. 22 1053.59 Lower-Middle 10.00 12 Costa Rica 49.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 Dom. Rep. 22</td>
<td>2053.59 Lower-Middle 10.00 12 Costa Rica 49.49</td>
<td>12 Costa Rica 49.49 Lower-Middle 10.00 12 Costa Rica 49.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>1898.00 Middle 10.00 13 Ecuador 48.27</td>
<td>13 Ecuador 10.15 14 Paraguay 46.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 Paraguay 11</td>
<td>1773.14 12 Peru 10.15 14 Paraguay 46.79</td>
<td>14 Paraguay 10.15 14 Paraguay 46.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 Ecuador 47</td>
<td>1705.06 13 Brazil 13.63 15 Dom. Rep. 40.21</td>
<td>15 Dom. Rep. 16.34 14 Bolivia 14.58 Middle N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower-Middle</td>
<td>1526.00 14 Bolivia 14.58 Middle N/A</td>
<td>16 Bolivia 29 952.71 15 Dom. Rep. 16.34 Lower-Middle N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: World Development Indicators. For years democratic, see Mainwaring (1999a). He defines authoritarian as a regime that has little effective political competition, including restrictions on political participation and civil liberties.

Notes:
(a) Refers to ranking within the 15 countries in this table.
(b) Indicates the number of years country was free of dictatorship between 1930 and 2000.
(c) Since year of independence, 1962.
(d) Latest figure available is 1998.
the majority of voters plus one (or fewer, if there are more than two contenders). It does not pay to spend money to obtain the support of all citizens when the support of a plurality or minimal majority will suffice. At some point, the extent to which political supporters champion the expansion of services to all will reach a ceiling.

More important, the factors that bring a leader into office might be different from the factors that take him or her out of office. Voters might elect a candidate on the basis of promises to deliver education, but might not necessarily vote him or her out of office for failing to deliver. Much will depend on:

- the strength of monitoring institutions: if they are weak, politicians can hide poor performance;
- the overall performance of incumbents: if politicians have other accomplishments, citizens may accept low performance on education;
- the strength of party alignments: voters may place party loyalty before candidate performance;
- the quality and fragmentation of opponents: the opposition may not attract enough votes to unseat incumbents;
- the themes selected by opinion-makers such as the media, commentators and party leaders: if opinion-makers ignore the role of education, voters may not know how to evaluate the government on this issue.

In short, democratic competition seems to facilitate the appearance of education on a political agenda by bringing the issue to light and generating promises from candidates, but is not a guarantee of educational expansion. Elections often do not provide strong sanctioning mechanisms against incumbents who falter on the delivery of education. Further research is needed to specify the particular institutional features of democracy (e.g., competitive and stable party competition or executive-legislative cooperation) that may promote expansion of social services.

FIVE POSSIBLE POLICIES

From the perspective of state officials, political incentives and pressures to promote universal basic and secondary education are weak. The most significant impediments to achieving universal primary and secondary schooling fall into five categories: 1) weak societal demand for education, 2) supply-side failures, 3) inefficient use of resources devoted to education, 4) opposition by those who bear the costs reform, and 5) weak accountability mechanisms for improving the performance of education systems. Advocates of universalized education must continue to think about policies that can overcome these obstacles. Important lessons can be learned from countries that have succeeded in expanding education despite facing one or more of the obstacles above. For example, as argued above, some countries have expanded education to include even citizens who have not demanded it. Some have expanded even as incomes declined and civil society was threatened—i.e., the expansion of
education under authoritarian regimes. Clearly, there are means to overcoming even the most substantial obstacles to expansion.

Some promising policy experiments in educational expansion are discussed below, with one primary example for each category of political problem. The list is not exhaustive, obviously, and none of the policies discussed is a panacea. Nevertheless, they offer reason to be optimistic that more can be done to overcome the political problems discussed in this paper.

To Boost Demand, Lower the Costs of School Attendance

States can reduce the cost to families of sending children to school, thereby stimulating societal demand. When sending a child to school is expensive (i.e., students are responsible for textbooks, school supplies, school fees, transportation costs, or lunch fees), demand for education weakens, especially among the poorest populations.

In Kenya, the introduction in 1988 of a cost-sharing system, where families were required to contribute to the expense of their child’s education, seems to have resulted in high dropout rates and declining enrollments (Bedi et al., 2004; Nafula, 2001). In contrast, Malawi quickly achieved universal primary education in the 1990s when the government eliminated school fees: gross enrollment rates jumped from 66 in 1990 to 135 in 1995 (Colclough and Al-Samarrai, 2000). In Brazil between 1994 and 1999, the proportion of 7- to 14-year-old children enrolled in school increased from 89 to 96 percent, and the number of illiterate citizens declined from 19.2 million in 1991 to 15.2 million by 1998. More so than other programs, subsidies to parents to send their children to school—and keep them there—led to these results. Brazil has nearly doubled its investment in school lunches since 1995 and has offered subsidies to low-income families that send their children to school (bolsa escola). Likewise, when Uganda eliminated primary-school tuition fees for up to four children per family in 1996, the impact was “immediate and tremendous”; primary completion rates rose from approximately 40 percent to 65 percent by 2001 (Bruns et al., 2003: 45).

Furthermore, if poor households face formidable barriers to completion—e.g., if poor children have access to primary but not to secondary education, if they tend to have higher repetition rates in primary education, or if local school infrastructure is in shambles—parents (and students) may feel that the investment in primary education is pointless, as the child will not have the opportunity to advance (Levine et al., 2003; see also PROBE, 1999). Expanding access to secondary education, reducing repetition rates in primary levels (typically correlated with income level), and upgrading school infrastructure may help expand household demand for schooling in underserved areas.

To Bolster the Supply Side (State Efforts), Improve State-Level Expertise and State-Society Links

Most education specialists identify “lack of political will” as a recurrent obstacle to educational expansion. Although “political will” is ubiquitous in the literature, the meaning of this term remains vague. It usually refers to situations
in which the executive branch devotes insufficient political attention to education, has a low appetite for conflict (and thus change), or devotes attention to education for reasons unrelated to education such as patronage (see Corrales, 1999). To a certain extent, the argument that low levels of political will lead to stagnant educational services is a truism. The argument is nonetheless intuitive, if difficult to test because there is no standard way to operationalize low levels of political will.

One way to study political will is to think of it in broader terms. “Will” can be defined as the supply-side strength of education reform, which is composed of various measurable factors. Some factors relate to state characteristics. For instance, high levels of ministerial turnover, intra-cabinet disagreement, failure to incorporate technocrats into the ministry, and weak ties between the ministry of education and multilateral organizations are all indicators of weak supply. As Crouch (2005) explains, these factors explain why Chile was able to introduce far-reaching educational reforms in the 1990s whereas Peru faltered.

State-variables are not the only components of the supply side. Also important are state-society links. When reformers form strong political coalitions—especially with political parties—the supply side is enhanced. For instance, Jacoby (2000) shows that, despite prevailing demand for change, secondary-education reform failed to take hold in Germany immediately following World War II because reformers did not establish links with political parties. In contrast, reforms took stronger (albeit not perfect) hold in eastern Germany after the 1989 collapse of the Berlin Wall, precisely because reformers forged stronger ties with civil society. In a study of Latin American countries, Grindle (2004) shows that countries whose ministers spent considerable time building cross-sectoral alliances were able to push for educational change, even against strong political opponents. Corrales (2004a) shows that the strength of the supply side, defined in terms of state and state-society variables, explains variation in levels of reform (significant in Central America, moderate in Argentina, insignificant in Peru) in Latin American countries where administrations were equally committed to market and state reforms.

Bolstering the supply side of education reform—that is, the political will to reform—involves strengthening both state capacity and societal inclusion. Yet inclusion is costly, and not only in terms of time and resources. To include and accommodate a key societal actor, reformers may also need to sacrifice certain policy goals. Furthermore, insistence on societal inclusion can be lethal to a reform—some groups may remain resolutely opposed to change and use inclusion as a way to sabotage policy changes. The determination of an appropriate balance of compromises in policy and social inclusion is a challenge for both scholars and practitioners.

To Improve Efficiency, Generate More Performance Indicators
Traditionally, the role of the state has been to provide services and to mitigate societal inequities. It is also necessary to see the state in a new light—as the
generator and disseminator of information. States in general fulfill this role only grudgingly or limitedly. In education, most statistics provided by the state relate to inputs (e.g., coverage and finance). International organizations deserve credit for pressuring states both to collect this information and to adhere to standard methods of measurement. Further work needs to be done in two areas. First, countries need to improve the quantity, accuracy, consistency, and reliability of the basic data on educational inputs that are already collected. Second, states need to collect and disseminate data on other aspects of the education system—indicators of student, teacher, and school performance.

Performance data can play a crucial political role in education reform. By bolstering the empirical foundations of their arguments, data strengthen the political position of reformers. Data can enable specialists to make more precise diagnoses of an education system’s failings. Information on school performance can also help citizens to evaluate the validity of claims made by state officials, in turn enhancing the quality of local debates.

More can be done to encourage states to generate more school, teacher, and student performance information. This will require more testing, which can be difficult to institute, as well as dissemination of results, which is even harder to implement. Political resistance to the dissemination of education data is pervasive at all levels—within bureaucracies, teachers unions, and schools. Leaders, administrators, and teachers fear that performance information will embarrass them and be used as ammunition to attack them. Because of this resistance, states need assistance from international actors to implement more testing. Newly emerging international nongovernmental organizations that hope to influence education policies could make increased testing a central lobbying issue.

To Contain Opposition, Compensate Threatened Actors

Although educational expansion increases spending, which produces more beneficiaries of government services, it may also involve direct costs to other beneficiaries. Policy-makers may want to consider ways to compensate those who bear the cost (Robinson, 1998) or whose benefits are reduced, in order to reduce opposition to change. In the 1990s, Chilean officials dealt with this problem by avoiding strict social-spending targets—i.e., they allowed low-middle-income groups, and not just the very poor, to continue to receive state assistance (Ruiz-Tagle, 2000). In doing so, they maintained both social peace and electoral victories.

Educational expansion can also create a cost for teachers, if it entails a requirement that teachers increase their productivity. Increasing labor market flexibility and establishing merit pay injects efficiency and accountability into education systems; however, these changes penalize teachers directly, through the loss of benefits such as guaranteed employment and promotions. Some form of protection for teachers, or maybe even compensation, may be necessary to counteract teachers’ union opposition.

One policy used to address this cost is to compensate unions with healthy
salary increases. This is a tricky issue because recent research by the World Bank, based on data from 47 low-income countries, shows that salary scales for teachers in primary education vary significantly, with some countries paying teachers too much and others paying too little (i.e., many deviate from what the World Bank deems an adequate level—namely, 3.3 percent of GDP) (Bruns et al., 2003). This variation in salary scales creates political complications. In countries where teacher salaries are low, the recommended policy is to raise wages; this gives rise to political difficulties with the ministry of finance and multilateral creditors interested in fiscal austerity. In countries where teachers are overpaid, salaries should not be increased, so as to avoid compounding inefficiencies; this decision infuriates teachers who, like most salaried workers, feel underpaid. Either way, adjusting salaries up or down is politically contentious.

Adjusting salaries is not the only complication—deciding on the criteria for salary increases might also be pressing. Salary increases that occur independent of performance—the case for salary changes in many developing countries—lead to underperformance. Kremer et al. (2004) find that one in four teachers in India’s public primary schools are absent on any given day, and they attribute this to lack of sanctioning mechanisms, poor monitoring, and decaying infrastructure (see also PROBE, 1999). Governments may find it hard to introduce sanctioning mechanisms for teachers, in part because unions will resist, but they could experiment with incentive schemes, infrastructure maintenance, and better accountability mechanisms to encourage improved teacher performance.

To Boost Accountability, Develop New Models of State-Society Cooperation

Given the economic constraints and political disincentives that obstruct universal education—especially during the latter stages of expansion—it is unrealistic for the international community to expect states to meet this challenge on their own. The task is formidable, and no state is competent or vice-free enough to achieve this goal without assistance. One of the most innovative developments of the post-war twentieth century was the rise of new international actors willing to assist states in the delivery of education (see Benavot and Resnik, 2003; Weiler, 1984). Although this innovation pushed education to new heights in many countries, it will not be enough to achieve universal education. States need further help.

The only other prospect for assistance is from civil society. Small efforts to incorporate more assistance from civil society have been attempted in the twentieth century, with what seem to be promising results. Although state-society partnerships are complicated and easily corrupted, they can have a positive impact on educational expansion.

19. Studying the incidence of teacher’s strike in Argentine provinces, Murillo and Ronconi (2004) find that after “political alignment between the governor and the union,” the most significant variable reducing strike activity is “real wage improvement” and “attendance bonuses.” Crouch (2005), using evidence from Chile and Peru, argues that differences in salary improvement explain unions’ acceptance or rejection of schemes to provide individual, merit-based bonuses for teachers.
One can imagine different combinations of state and societal inputs in an education system. For the sake of simplicity, I consider only two types of input—school management and education finance. Table 8 identifies three possible levels of state input and three possible levels of societal input. Cells A through I provide examples.

Education in secular states is typically conceived as relying on the state to move from cell A, where there is zero education provision, to cell C, where presumably the state meets all of society’s educational needs. However, as argued, states in developing countries seldom have the resources and incentives to travel this far. Furthermore, it is not clear that an exclusively statist system is desirable, given all the problems that arise from excessive statism. Cell C is thus unrealistic and undesirable.

Cell G represents traditional thinking on private education. The state grants nongovernmental organizations the right to offer private education, perhaps with a subsidy. Management, financing, and ownership of the property are private. The main problem with private provision of education is that schools have little incentive to serve needy students.

In moving toward universalization, it makes sense to consider a model of state-society cooperation in which neither exclusive state provision nor exclusive private provision of education predominates. This would entail moving across the two axes by supplementing state efforts with societal efforts (moving from cell C to cells F and I) and by simultaneously supplementing private efforts with more state involvement (move from cell G to cells H and I).

The supplementation of state efforts with societal efforts has characterized Latin American educational systems since the 1950s. States provide most educational services but have allowed a parallel system of private education,

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**Table 8: Different Combinations of State and Society Inputs (with examples of societies where these combinations are prevalent)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society Involvement</th>
<th>State Involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Minimum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td>No educational provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td>Minimal schooling (18th and 19th century Europe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td>Statist Monopoly (Totalitarian Regimes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.</td>
<td>Home schooling (poorest African countries; war-torn regions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E.</td>
<td>Modest coverage (less poor African countries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.</td>
<td>Mostly state schools, with very few private schools (East Asia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G.</td>
<td>Minimally subsidized private education (Denominational schools in advanced democracies)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H.</td>
<td>Mixed systems with heavily subsidized private education (urban Latin America)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Mixed systems with schools of many types; two-way accountability (both state and society actors more engaged in monitoring schools)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
which is frequently subsidized by the state (cell H). In 1996, primary and secondary enrollments in private schools in Latin America were 16.4 percent and 23.8 percent (Wolff, 2002: 16); these levels of enrollment save the state some money. Private schools help the state to meet education demand by finding ways to attract students, collect tuition from those who can pay, and save resources for the state by operating more efficiently than public systems (Navarro, 2002). However, as long as these schools remain tuition-driven, with their own particular admission standards, this model of state-society cooperation will not expand coverage universally.

Achieving universal education will require alternative forms of state-society cooperation. Educational systems need to be able to harness greater societal inputs—this is the promise of self-managed or community-managed schools.

“Harambee” groups in Kenya are one notable form of self-managed schools. Harambee groups are self-help communities of rural citizens. These groups mobilize resources, provide infrastructure, and manage schools. The number of Harambee schools grew from zero at the time of independence to 1,497 schools by 1987 (Oguyi, 1995: 127). Most of the expansion of primary and secondary education in Kenya since independence has occurred through the efforts of Harambee groups. Therkildsen and Semboja (1995) compare Kenya with Tanzania and Uganda, whose education systems were, at the time of independence, at similar stages of development. Of these, Kenya had produced the most impressive expansion of coverage by 1990 (Table 9). Tanzania relied exclusively on state-run schools; this allowed the government to make huge inroads, but not nearly to the extent that Kenya did. Tyranny-ridden and war-torn Uganda, which had neither state nor private education (cell E) hardly improved. Kenya’s remarkable achievement is all the more surprising given that government spending on education remained stable, and at times declined.

Despite these accomplishments, the model provided by the Kenyan experience ought not be emulated. Harambee groups formed and took on educational responsibilities as a result of failing state initiative. Even in good years, state finance was limited to teachers’ salaries as well as some school supplies and milk for students. In other years, the state denied funding even to Harambee groups or tried to control them (Kanyinga, 1995). Harambee groups emerged as a society-based survival effort—in the absence of state

**Table 9:** Gross Enrollment Ratios in Primary Education in East Africa, 1960 and 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>1960</th>
<th>1990</th>
<th>Type of System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>Mixed (State and Harambee groups)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>State monopoly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>Low State and Society Inputs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Therkildsen and Semboja (1995).
help, rural communities organized to meet their educational needs. In this model, society has to finance most education, which is onerous for rural communities and, as most research shows, depresses school attendance. Furthermore, the quality of Harambee schools is inferior to that of government schools.

Another model of state-society partnership is that of self-managed schools, which have emerged in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua (see Table 10), as well as parts of Brazil and Colombia in the 1990s. Self-managed schools differ from traditional private schooling in that the state provides the entire operating budget for the school (therefore there is no tuition), and differ from traditional public schooling in that school administration is transferred entirely to local organizations typically composed of parents, teachers, and civilian administrators. These organizations are authorized to spend on infrastructure, and more significant, to hire and fire teachers, as they see fit. In Nicaragua, these organizations also have authority over curricula.

Data show that self-managed schools carry social and academic promise: 1) they boost societal demand for schooling; 2) they expand coverage quickly, especially in rural areas, because state funding guarantees free tuition and parents provide the infrastructure (sometimes offering their homes as teaching facilities if no schools have been built); and 3) they empower civil society.

Table 10: Alternative Models of State-Society Provision of Education: Latin American Cases in the 1990s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Traditional (municipal)</th>
<th>Subsidized (Chilean model)</th>
<th>Self-Managed (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras)</th>
<th>Self-Managed (Nicaragua)</th>
<th>Private Traditional (school fees)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Funding</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Public</td>
<td>Public with capacity to raise private funding</td>
<td>Mostly private</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(central government)</td>
<td>(with capacity to raise private funding)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ownership of Establishment</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td>Public in concession to an NGO</td>
<td>Private</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spending Autonomy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Infrastructure Maintenance)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Personnel Autonomy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Hire and Fire Teaching Staff)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pedagogy Autonomy</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Modify Curriculum and Select Textbooks)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: based on di Gropello (2004).
because parents form civic associations to run schools, often in communities
where few other social organizations exist. Research also shows that student
retention, teacher attendance, and academic achievement seem to improve,
or at least do not worsen, in comparison to traditional schools (see di
Gropello, 2004; López, 2005). As with all decentralized programs, self-man-
aged schools carry risks. If the new managers (in this case, parents) are not
trained or made accountable, or if they are given more responsibility than
they can handle, self-managed schools can lead to deterioration of school
services.

Although the model of state-funded, society-managed schools has the
advantage of combining state resources (which precludes charging tuition)
and societal energies (which might promote civil society and society-based
accountability), it can nonetheless be plagued with complications, such as
corruption and lack of accountability. For this reason, this system will work
when the state has the capacity to monitor and sanction communities that
mismanage funds, and local communities have strong mechanisms for hold-

ing school administrators accountable. Herein lies the problem. In most
developing countries, these two conditions occur infrequently. This is one
reason that enthusiasm for self-managed schools is limited. Another reason
for limited enthusiasm is that teachers’ unions tend to oppose self-managed
schools. They rightly fear that self-managed schools will be susceptible to
manipulation by local authorities. They also dread a transformation of the
more cordial parent-teacher relationship into a more contentious employer-
employee relationship. Overall, teachers’ unions may most vehemently
oppose the opening of independent schools without union contracts.

In short, universalization will require highly statist systems to find ways
to make room for more societal inputs in the provision of education.
Likewise, exclusively private systems must make room for greater state regu-
lation, supervision, and resources. These reforms will give rise to new com-
lications and political conflicts. The task is not to shy away from this, but to
find preventive and corrective measures.

CONCLUSION: THE CAUSES AND
TRADEOFFS OF UNIVERSALIZATION

This paper has argued that some of the incentives and pressures that push
states to expand primary and secondary education are relatively weak or per-
verse in the last stages of educational expansion, particularly in developing
countries. At the international level, capitalism exercises an ambiguous influ-
ence, or possibly a meager positive pressure; multilaterals do not have effec-
tive oversight or sanctioning mechanisms; and international consensus about
the value of education does not always change domestic political institutions,
especially at the last stages of educational expansion. At the state level, the
political and economic conditions that drove states historically to promote
education have weakened. Patronage remains one of the strongest incentives
to expand education, but it is also at the root of poor quality and inefficiency. The two most important ingredients to boost societal demand—income levels and organization—are often lacking in developing countries among those who are the last to receive education.

For these reasons, it is unrealistic to expect states—as lone actors—to produce universal basic and secondary education. An exclusively state-driven effort to universalize education presents the opportunity for more political vices to enter education systems. International organizations and societal actors are necessary checks against these unwanted outcomes and can help states overcome the institutional obstacles that limit improvements in quality and efficiency.

There are many research questions that remain to be addressed. Cross-country variations in speed of expansion have been well known since the 1970s; the extent of variations in efficiency is a more recent discovery (see Bruns et al., 2003). These variations in school systems remain largely unexplained. For scholars interested in explaining these variations, this paper offers a word of caution against the tendency, typical among contemporary social scientists, to insist on identifying the “one key variable” that bests explains all characteristics of a system. Not one factor reviewed in this paper seems, on its own, either sufficient or necessary to alter speeds of expansion or degrees of efficiency and quality.

Perhaps it is best to think about the intellectual task ahead in terms of what Ragin (2004) calls “multiple conjunctural causation.” This is a situation in which the same outcome can emerge through “different combinations” of many explanatory variables, depending on the setting (emphasis in the original). For Ragin, multiple conjunctural causal arguments can even take contradictory forms. One example of this was suggested in the section “International Pressures”: in relatively stable countries that have not yet approached the flatter part of the S-curve, the influence of the World Bank can be beneficial and significant; however, in less politically and economically stable countries at the latter stages of the S-curve, World Bank influence may be null or negative.

To reach conclusions about multiple conjunctural causations requires, of course, quantitative studies able to test models specifying interactions among variables. However, quantitative studies on cross-country variations in speed of expansion and degree of efficiency are likely to suffer from an unhealthy ratio of too few cases to many independent variables. For that reason, qualitative studies, which excel at identifying the origins, trajectories, and alternatives within a set of comparable cases, are equally indispensable.

A second open question relates to the possible trade off between education expansion and education quality. A narrow focus on increasing access may result in inattention to quality. Expanding education without worrying about what or whether students learn is tantamount to merely providing day care. Although keeping children in school is a major accomplishment, especially in developing countries where street life is precarious, we clearly must strive to provide children with more than day care. It is possible, moreover,
that increasing the number of students in school could lead not just to the neglect of quality, but also to its detriment. For instance, governments may be tempted to overpopulate classrooms, to expand coverage through merit-blind hiring of teachers, or to carry out indiscriminate bidding on school infrastructure projects. Educational expansion may be financed by taking resources away from infrastructure maintenance. School facilities decay as a result, which leads to teacher absences (Kremer et al., 2004), less learning, and diminished parental demand for schooling (PROBE, 1999). Or, governments may finance expansion by resisting raises in teacher’s salaries, which could produce more teachers’ union strikes, which hurt both learning and political stability. There is a danger that universal education may lead, paradoxically, to more education of lesser quality. Research on how best to mitigate this trade off is needed.

Finally, it is too easy to explain variation in educational attainment by attributing it to family background or the socioeconomic context of the school. In the 1970s and 1980s, research showed that attainment is influenced by the quality of teaching materials, teacher motivation, and length of instruction, not just family background (see Fuller and Heyneman, 1989; Simmons and Alexander, 1980). In the late 1990s, another variable was added to this list: information. Clearly, without adequate information about school performance, no stakeholder in the education system (principal, teacher, bureaucrat, parent, or student) can generate diagnoses about teaching practices that work and don’t work. The route to better-educated students could very well be through better-educated adults.
Appendix 1: Political Competition and School Expansion in Kerala

The Indian state of Kerala (population 32 million) has achieved impressive enrollment indicators, which far surpass the national average:

Table A: Schooling Achievements in Kerala, Relative to the National Average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Kerala</th>
<th>India</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female School Enrollment Rate (age 6–17 years)</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>66.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male School Enrollment Rate (age 6–17 years)</td>
<td>91.0</td>
<td>77.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural girls never in school (age 10–12 years)</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural population in villages with a middle school</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>44.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Political competition, of various forms and at various stages, has played an important role in educational expansion in Kerala.

1. Religious and Inter-community Competition in the late Nineteenth Century, and the Early Expansion of Literacy. Well before the large inflow of Europeans into South Asia, the region of present-day Kerala had a significant Syrian Christian minority. This local Christian minority accounted for a disproportionate number of European missionaries deciding to settle in Kerala by the middle of the nineteenth century. To obtain converts, especially among lower-caste Hindus, Christian missionaries established their own schools. Resenting these newcomers, Syrian Christians, and later upper-class Hindus and Muslim minorities, established their own schools to compete with missionary schools. Soon, communities began to lobby the state for funding. The government responded by creating a system of per-student subsidies.

2. Post-Independence Political Party Competition. Competitive party systems often stimulate the supply of social services and may explain why Kerala devoted more funding to social services than other Indian states. Whereas party competition was limited at the national level because the Indian National Congress Party held comfortable majorities during most of the post-independence period, in Kerala, the Indian National Congress Party faced stiff competition from the local Communist Party. Both parties alternated in office frequently. Furthermore, voter turnout rates in Kerala
(ranging from 72 to 81 percent) were consistently higher than for the country as a whole (ranging from 47 to 64 percent).

3. **Organized Constituencies as Strong Demanders and Defenders of Schools.** In the early stages of party competition in Kerala, several ruling parties attempted to either eliminate community-based schools or to monopolize education. Their goal was to assert state control over society. However, in every case, the electorate responded by punishing incumbents and voting them out of office. The extremely effective grant-in system created in the late nineteenth century generated well-organized constituencies that effectively defended schools from attempts by the state to achieve control. Jeffrey (1992) documents three important early cases of state officials seeking to establish control; all ended in political defeat (See Table B). As a result of these electoral lessons, no subsequent state official made attempts to curtail school funding or to seek to monopolize the education system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>State Official</th>
<th>Announced Policies</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mid 1940s</td>
<td>C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar (Government of Travancore)</td>
<td>Nationalize Primary Schools</td>
<td>Intense opposition from Catholics partly responsible for downfall of Ramaswami Aiyar’s administration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Panampilli Govinda Menon (Kerala Education Minister, Congress)</td>
<td>Teachers chosen from government list; fees held in government treasuries</td>
<td>Congress loses several by-elections, government falls and Menon dismissed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Communist Government</td>
<td>Education Act – Greater government control of grant schools, teachers paid and selected by government</td>
<td>Extensive opposition “liberation struggle” causes fall of communist government in 1959</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Bibliography


